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This study analyzed the impact of PVYn and potato wart disease outbreaks in PEI on 
the potato industry.  These disease outbreaks resulted in the loss of the US seed export 
market to PEI producers. The effects of the disease outbreaks were mitigated through 
value-added processing. Price premiums for processed potatoes allowed PEI potato 
producers to abandon seed exports without incurring losses. Evidence is presented to 
suggest that other countries have also used this approach when export restrictions were 
placed on domestic agricultural industries.  Policy response to the two disease 
outbreaks include: i) development of a zones policy that helped to reopen markets into 
the US; and ii) financial compensation to producers above the minimum levels required 
under the Seeds Act and Regulations. Implementation of the zones policy had beneficial 
impacts on the potato industry and is mirrored in other disease outbreaks. In contrast, 
compensation above minimum requirements may set a costly precedent for future 
disease outbreaks and may have caused moral hazard problems. 
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1.0  Introduction 
 
  The recent incidence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow 
disease in Western Canada highlights the devastating impacts that disease outbreaks 
can have on the agrifood industry.  Disease outbreaks (even those that pose no threat 
to human health) are often perceived as a primary health concern and can shake 
consumer confidence in the agrifood system.  When disease outbreaks involve traded 
commodities, such outbreaks disrupt national and international trade, and can result in 
loss of important markets.   
 
In 1989, there was a disease outbreak of the Potato
 virus Y (PVYn) in Prince 
Edward Island, resulting in closure of the international border into the US to PEI seed 
potatoes for approximately two years.  The PVYn outbreak was followed with the 
discovery of potato wart (Synchytrium endobioticum) in a single field, in PEI, in October 
2000.  This led to a total ban on the export of potatoes (either tablestock or seed) into 
the US for approximately 6 weeks, after which the ban was lifted on tablestock potatoes.  
The ban on seed exports lasted approximately nine months.  
 
Potato virus Y (PVY type species of the genus Potyvirus) is an economically 
important virus. PVY is transmitted by aphids and infects several Solanaceae crop 
species (Tribodet et al., 2005).  The most common of the PVY potato strains are PVYn 
and PVYo. In the case of potatoes, the viral infection induces mild mottling with 
occasional necrotic leaves, but has little or no damaging effect on the quality of the 
potato tuber. It also has some minimal effect on potato yields.  By comparison, because 
PVYn is lethal to tobacco, it is important to contain the spread of the disease.  PVYn is 
particularly important in the seed potato sector because the disease can be transmitted 
to successive crops through seed tubers. 
 
There was also an incidence of potato wart in 2000 in PEI (Baayen et al., 2005; 
CBC, 2004a).  Potato wart is similar to PVYn in that it is not dangerous to humans but in 
contrast, it renders potato tubers worthless.  While the potato wart discovered was 
limited to a single site, it can potentially have a more serious long-term impact on 
potatoes, lasting up to 40 years on the site where it is discovered.  As a result, the PEI 
field where it was found was taken out of production and strict controls were placed on 
PEI potatoes to contain the disease.    
 
The first objective of this study is to assess industry trends in the potato industry 
and their potential impacts in mitigating future disease outbreaks in the Canadian potato 
industry. A second objective is to assess the appropriateness of the policy responses to 
the PVYn and potato wart outbreaks in Canada, and to address the potential lessons 
that can be learned in dealing with other disease outbreaks.    
  
The following section provides a brief outline of the PVYn crises, followed by a 
trend analysis of the potato market, both in PEI and for the rest of Canada to assess 
how a similar disease outbreak in the future could affect the Canadian potato market.   4
An assessment of policy response to the disease outbreaks is then presented.  The 
study concludes with a summary and conclusion.   
 
2.0  Evolution of the Disease Outbreaks in Potatoes 
 
In 1989, the tobacco virus Tobacco Veinal Necrosis (TVN) was diagnosed on 
tobacco plants in Ontario. TVN, also known as Potato Virus Y (PVYn), is a virus which 
causes necrosis in tobacco plants and can infect numerous other types of broad-leafed 
plants, including potatoes (Tribodet et al., 2005).  After the initial discovery of PVYn in 
Ontario, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) tested for PVYn throughout 
Canada.  Testing confirmed the highest prevalence of PVYn in PEI and, to a lesser 
extent, in New Brunswick.  As a result of the discovery of PVYn in 1989, 1990 and 
1991, the US banned imports of PEI potatoes into the US for approximately two years.  
Tablestock potatoes were unaffected, so long as they were treated with a sprout 
inhibitor. The ban on PEI seed potatoes was lifted for the 1992/93 crop year when a 
“zones” policy was implemented. The zones policy was the result of  negotiations 
involving the US, AAFC and PEI, and involved: i) an eradication plan for PEI potatoes 
affected by PVYn; and ii) the creation of five km radius quarantine zones around 
detected incidences of PVYn.  Initial tests in 1991 indicated “PVY” in 95 seed lots in 
PEI. This number was later reduced to ten when further testing detected 85 “false 
positives” (a harmless strain of PVY called PVYo).  By the 1994 crop year, AAFC had 
demonstrated to the US through testing of imported US potatoes that PVYn was present 
in the US, at least to a similar extent as in Canada.  The US could therefore no longer 
claim that it was a PVYn disease-free area. Consequently, all restrictions on Canadian 
potatoes were lifted by the US. 
 
Since the US was assumed to be a disease free area, the US response was 
justified under WTO trade rules. However, there is controversy surrounding this disease 
free status, given the evidence that PVYn already existed in the US, despite the official 
US position of disease free status. The Canadian Phytopathological Society (2001) 
claimed that scholars were aware of PVYn in the US prior to the outbreak in PEI, and 
that experts were combating the disease in tobacco (a form of the virus called TVN that 
strikes tobacco) in North Carolina for years. Evidence of TVN in tobacco suggests that 
the US was already combating this disease for some time (Gooding and Tolin, 1973).  
Susceptibility of potatoes to the PVY strains detected in the US was never confirmed in 
potatoes prior to the outbreak in PEI (McDonald and Kristjansson, 1993). Furthermore, 
the likelihood of the disease being in the US was high once it was confirmed in PEI 
since potatoes had been shipped from PEI to the US for years prior to the PVYn 
outbreak (Singh, 1992). The policy response of the US appears excessive given the 
evidence.  The evidence suggests that “disease free status” under the WTO rules is a 
difficult concept to define, and may have lead to unwarranted trade restrictions imposed 
by the US in the case of the PVYn disease outbreak in PEI.     
  
   As a result of the discovery of potato wart in PEI in 2000, the US imposed a total 
ban on PEI potatoes entering the US for six weeks between late October and mid-
December, 2000 (CBC, 2004a).  In November 2000, testing by AAFC showed that the   5
potato wart was limited to the single field.  Soon after, the US lifted the ban on 
tablestock entering the US but not seed potatoes.  The US also banned any imports of 
potatoes coming into the US originating within 40 kms of the infected field (i.e., 
approximately 12.5 percent of the area seeded to potatoes in PEI).  A maximum sized 
bag of 22.5 kg was placed on imports into the US, and province of origin labeling 
(POOL) (i.e., “Product of PEI” label) was imposed. In April 2001, the US lifted its ban on 
seed potatoes, and cleaning and treating restrictions, but not the bag size or labeling 
requirements.  Additional discoveries of potato wart in PEI in 2002 and 2003 were made 
outside of the zones but did not result in further restrictions placed on potatoes other 
than the requirement that the land on which potato wart was discovered be taken out of 
production. 
 
3.0  Industry Trends in Canadian Potato Industry 
 
The PVYn crisis, together with the potato wart scare, disrupted traditional 
established links in seed potato trade between Canada and the United States.  These 
links were never really re-established in PEI, as illustrated in Figure 1.  Figure 1 shows 
the value of PEI seed potato exports into the US.  The value of PEI seed potatoes 
imported by the US shows a declining trend. From approximately $6 million before the 
PVYn crisis, the value of the PEI seed potato export market into the US fell to below $1 
million by the 2004/05 crop year. Figure 1 also illustrates the shocks to the PEI export 
market in the US resulting from both PVYn (1991/92 crop year) and potato wart (crop 
year 2000/01) when the value of exports of seed potatoes into the US fell to virtually 
zero. The figure also illustrates that the shock associated with potato wart in 2000 was 
approximately one-sixth of the shock associated with PVYn. As illustrated in Figure 1, 
the value of seed potato exports recovered after the potato wart outbreak in 2000/01 to 
its pre-shut down level, still it has never reached the value from the times before PVYn 
outbreak in 1989.  This implies that, while there seems to be a permanent effect 
associated with border restrictions associated with PVYn, this does not seem to be the 
case with potato wart.  
 
At the same time, there has been an expansion of the potato industry as a whole 
in PEI, especially processed potatoes.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, a plot of the 
seeded area of potatoes in PEI. Seeded area grew from approximately 70,000 acres in 
1988 to approximately 110,000 only ten years later in 1999. Since the year 2000, 
seeded area has stabilized at just under 100,000 acres. In contrast to the trend in the 
value of seed potato exports to the US illustrated in Figure 1,  the PVYn and potato wart 
disease outbreaks had little (if any) impact on total seeded area in PEI. In other words, 
while both PVYn and potato wart had an impact on the PEI seed potato market, the 
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 The expansion of the potato market in PEI has been fuelled by an expansion in 
the processing potato market. From approximately 25 percent of the overall market in 
PEI during the mid to late 1980s, the processing potato market currently accounts for 
approximately 60 percent of total potato production in PEI (DeHann, 2006).  
 
The expansion of the processed potato sector in PEI has little to do with PVYn or 
potato wart outbreaks. There has been little or no incentive for PEI producers to re-
establish the seed potato market, stemming from the establishment of additional 
processing capacity in PEI in the late 1990s resulting in price premiums paid to PEI 
potato producers.  There are three markets for PEI potatoes:  the tablestock market, the 
seed market and processing market. Among the three, the tablestock market is the 
lowest valued. By comparison, the seed and processing markets command price 
premiums, as long as producers provide the quality attributes required.  The 
establishment of two processing plants on PEI (one by Cavendish Farms, and the other 
by McCains Foods) resulted in higher price premiums paid to producers for processing 
potatoes.  Thus, the new (higher) premiums to processed potatoes made the PEI seed 
potato market less competitive. The new processing facilities also decreased the 
marketing risk of processed potatoes, and increased the value of processed potatoes in 
PEI.    
 
Processed potatoes offer PEI potato producers the opportunity to enter a high 
valued market for their potatoes without the risk of the seed market.  At the same time, 
there was probably little or no incentive to re-enter the seed market lost during the 
PVYn outbreak. Based on the expansion of processing potato acreage in PEI, it seems 
reasonable to argue that the processed potatoes replaced seed potatoes as a high 
valued, high quality market for PEI potatoes. Superior managers switched their talents 
from seed to processed potatoes. An important outcome of the changes in the market is 
that another disease outbreak like PVYn would not have such a dramatic impact on the 
PEI potato industry.  Indeed, the impact associated with the potato wart scare was 
much smaller than from PVYn.  The reason is that processing would have destroyed the 
PVYn virus, thereby making disease-induced trade restrictions on (processed) potatoes 
unnecessary.  Thus, value-added processing can, at least partially, mitigate the 
negative impacts of disease outbreaks.   
 
4.0  Similarities with Other Disease Outbreaks 
 
A question that arises is:  To what extent is the trend in the PEI potato industry 
towards more value added processing mirrored in the experience of other disease 
outbreaks?  In the case of the Canadian experience with respect to the BSE outbreak, 
Rude et al. (2007) point out that several processing plants planned expansion as a 
result of the ban on cattle exports into the US.  However, Canadian processors were 
reluctant to go ahead with costly expansion plans given that there was so much 
uncertainty surrounding how US processors would respond to the increased competition 
resulting from the re-opening of the border.  For example, the possibility of predatory 
pricing strategies on the part of US processing plants when the border reopened made 
Canadian processors hesitate to commit large sums of money to build extra capacity.   8
Clearer examples of value added processing to mitigate disease outbreaks are 
provided by various disease outbreaks related to Avian Flu.  Recent outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) are recorded in both China and Thailand.  Both of 
these disease outbreaks caused significant trade disruptions for these countries 
(Blayney et al., 2006; Wang, 2006; USDA, 2007). While HPAI is detrimental to poultry 
flocks, the virus is killed through cooking. Hence, the majority of markets for processed 
poultry remained open throughout the HPAI crises in both countries and processed 
poultry was unaffected by bans on raw product movement.  
 
Restructuring towards increased processing capacity occurred subsequent to the 
HPAI outbreaks in both countries (Blayney et al., 2006).  In the case of the HPAI 
disease outbreak in China, a major Chinese market into Japan was permanently lost.  
However, this resulted in large foreign investment in the Chinese poultry processing 
sector (Blayney et al., 2006),   allowing the Chinese to shift their poultry industry from 
one largely dependent upon raw product exports (and susceptible to disease outbreak 
trade restrictions) to a largely value added processing sector (and less susceptible to 
disease outbreak trade restrictions).  Therefore, another such disease outbreak in either 
country would not have such a large impact on the Chinese industry. 
 
The recent Avian Influenza disease outbreak in Saskatchewan in 2007 is also 
instructive.  Since the poultry industry in Saskatchewan was entirely domestic (actually 
Provincial) and no raw product exported, there were no bans placed on Provincial or 
National shipments of product.  Hence, the fact that the Saskatchewan poultry industry 
already had value added processing meant that the trade disruptions resulting from the 
Avian Influenza  disease outbreak was almost completely mitigated.                 
 
5.0  Policy Responses to the PVYn and Potato Wart Crises 
 
The immediate policy response by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) 
to the PVYn crisis was to institute new testing procedures to ensure the false positive 
testing problem was not repeated.  Long term policy responses of government to the 
crises were remarkably similar.  These responses can be classified into two types: 
 
1)  negotiate with the US to establish a zones policy to contain the outbreak, and 
lift the ban on seed potatoes entering the US; and 
 
2)  compensate producers for losses associated with the disease outbreaks over 
and above the minimum required by the Seeds Act and Regulations (e.g. 
Canadian Legal Information Institute, 2007). 
 
5.1  Negotiations and zones policy 
 
The PVYn outbreak led to the establishment of a total ban on Canadian potatoes 
entering the US for approximately two weeks during the 1989/90 crop year. The ban 
was lifted after the two week period for tablestock potatoes, but with a requirement that 
such potatoes be treated with a spout inhibitor.  The market most affected by the PVYn   9
disease outbreak was the seed potato market.  The ban was lifted only after the zones 
policy was instituted for the 1992/93 crop year, with the restriction on the importation of 
potatoes only applied to fields surrounding those where PVYn was found.  This was the 
first time that a zones policy was used to contain a disease outbreak for potatoes in 
Canada.   
 
A zones policy was also instituted as a result of the potato wart scare.  This 
resulted in the ban on seed potatoes being lifted after nine months in the crop year 
2000/01 (Baayen et al., 2005; CBC, 2004a). In 2006, Golden Nematode was discovered 
in potatoes in Quebec (AAFC, 2006a; AAFC, 2006c), leading to a ban on potatoes 
entering the US for approximately five weeks.  This ban was also lifted after 
negotiations between the USDA and AAFC, leading to implementation of another zones 
policy. 
 
The establishment of zones policies to contain disease outbreaks is probably the 
most lasting and effective method to mitigate the impacts of disease outbreaks in 
potatoes.  There are two advantages of this type of policy.  First, it limits the affected 
area to the minimum acceptable to both the exporter and importer.  Given that different 
diseases have different abilities to spread and different impacts, it seems reasonable to 
negotiate these on a piecemeal basis among the affected parties.  This certainly is 
better than the initial banning of imports from arbitrary political boundaries like the 
Province of PEI.     
 
Second, the zones policy is consistent with the overall thrust of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO’s) “Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures” policy on the control of disease outbreaks (WTO, 2007).  Zones and their 
relationship to international trade has recently been a major topic of discussion by WTO 
members.  At the level of the WTO, these discussions take place under the moniker 
“regionalization”.  The term regionalization refers to how a country that is not disease 
free can divide its national territory into “regions” that are declared disease free so that 
product from disease free regions can flow into international markets even though the 
total territory of the country is not disease free.  This allows trade to flow from disease 
free areas without blanket bans on the whole national territory.  From the perspective of 
the US, even the initial ban of seed entering the US was probably consistent with 
regionalization, since the bans were placed on individual Provinces and not the country 
as a whole. Furthermore, the ban was placed only on seed potatoes, and not 
tablestock.    
 
Under the present notion of regionalization, much of the discussion surrounds the 
establishment of regions for specific diseases where the country in question is not 
presumed to be disease free (e.g. Loppacher et al., 2006).  In this sense, the 
regionalization discussion tends to be more reactive than proactive in nature.  A more 
proactive approach can be found in the notion of developing ex-ante zones policies. The 
idea of ex-ante zones policies is that, if a disease strikes, a country has a containment 
strategy with which to demonstrate to trading partners that the situation is under control, 
with the hope of minimizing the trade disruptions associated with potential disease   10
outbreaks.  There is some evidence that the trade disruptive effects of the recent foot-
in-mouth disease outbreak in the UK was at least partially mitigated because UK 
officials had an ex-ante zones policy in place before the discovery of the disease 
(Council of the European Union, 2003).  There is also evidence that the Thailand 
government developed an ex-ante zones (called compartments) policy for Avian 
Influenza (USDA, 2007). Regardless of its impacts on trade, the development of ex-ante 
zones policies boosts consumer confidence in the health and safety of the food system 
by demonstrating the governments are prepared to deal with disease outbreaks when 
they happen.     
 
The history of disease outbreaks in potatoes and the development of zones 
policies emphasize that zones policy development ought to be both ex-ante and the 
result of at least bilateral or, better yet, multilateral negotiations.  For example, the policy 
developed by the UK to contain the foot-in-mouth disease outbreak was unilateral in 
nature, and was not accepted by some of its EU trading partners when the disease 
outbreak occurred.  Had these discussions taken place with trading partners and 
agreements on zones secured ex-ante, then they may have been more effective in 
mitigating the trade impacts of this disease outbreak.  It is also likely that ex-ante 
negotiations over such disease outbreaks may be much more balanced, since ex-ante, 
it is not clear which country will be struck by the disease and which country will restrict 
imports.  It is likely that more equal treatment will be given to both domestic as well as 
foreign industries in an ex-ante negotiation process. 
 
It could be true that countries are reluctant to develop zones policies that are 
unilateral and ex-ante because the existence of such plans indicate to other trading 
partners an admission of susceptibility that may diminish the bargaining power of the 
country that develops such plans in future negotiations.  This could be an example of a 
“hold up” problem (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996) in the development of ex-ante disease 
outbreak plans.  Furthermore, the mere expression of interest in negotiating certain 
diseases may signal to negotiating partners the fear of an outbreak that may limit the 
ability of a country to develop an efficient zones policy through bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations.    
 
A final lesson that can be taken from the experience of disease outbreaks in 
potatoes as they relate to the development of zones policies is that the list of diseases 
included in the discussions during multilateral negotiations ought to be comprehensive 
in nature. The frequency with which disease outbreaks with significant trade impacts 
have struck the PEI potato industry implies that such occurrences may not be unusual 
events.  Indeed, in 2006, another disease outbreak, this time of Golden Nematode, 
occurred in Quebec, (with a closely related disease occurrence in Idaho).  This resulted 
in border closings to Quebec potatoes of approximately two weeks before a zones 
policy was implemented. Therefore, over the last twenty years, there have been three 
disease outbreaks that have resulted in trade restrictions imposed on potatoes crossing 
the US/Canada border.     
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The frequency of occurrence seems to imply that a comprehensive approach to 
disease outbreaks may be more appropriate than the ex-post, one disease approach 
used in the past.  While the occurrence of disease outbreaks in potatoes is somewhat 
predictable, the actual disease to strike potatoes is unpredictable.  Therefore, bilateral 
negotiations between the US and Canada over all potentially trade threatening diseases 
that may strike potatoes ought to take place.  These negotiations ought to outline border 
restrictions, zones policies, etc. in the event of a disease outbreak from a 
comprehensive list of potentially trade threatening diseases for potatoes.  That way, in 
the event that a disease outbreak occurs, policies already agreed to can be 
implemented to ensure minimum trade disruptions while maintaining health and safety 
standards.  Recent examples of this approach in other industries and countries have 
been limited to a few specific diseases, such as BSE and Avian Influenza.  What the 
history of disease outbreaks in potatoes suggests is an expanded list, which would 
include bilateral negotiations that include a study of a greater number of diseases, 
including those that have not yet occurred.     
 
The successful development of zones policies depends on domestic factors as 
well. The handling of the PVYn incident and eradication efforts in Canada were not well 
received by all farmers, especially in areas outside of PEI. In Adams v. Borrel, it was 
claimed that the zones policy caused hardship for New Brunswick growers. The 
plaintiffs did not oppose zones directly but rather opposed certain aspects of the zones 
policy. Although it was ruled that Agriculture Canada met the standard of care and 
provided a reasonable duty of care to prevent the spread of PVYn and the case was 
dismissed, it is interesting to consider the legality of zoning in general. It is a common 
understanding among legal scholars that when WTO agreements and domestic laws 
conflict, WTO agreements take precedence. In addition, no domestic subject can appeal 
WTO regulations since there is no private rights protection under the WTO. Therefore, 
producers could not appeal directly Canada’s obligations under the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures of the WTO agreement with respect to mandated zones. 
Producers could appeal zoning proposed by Canadian agencies, however, it is almost 
certain that international law would prevail over Canada’s normative law. The evidence 
therefore suggests that, even when comprehensive zones policies are developed, 
domestic political realities may make such policies infeasible, especially if they are 
developed without prior consultation with domestic groups that may be harmed by their 
implementation. 
 
  Such a comprehensive approach to disease outbreaks will require genuine 
commitments by all member nations. Evidence suggests that noncompliance to WTO 
commitments frequently occurs by a select group of nations. By the end of first quarter 
in 2007, 109 panel and panel/Appellate Body reports where adopted because of 
disputes over WTO commitments, and of these, violations of WTO commitments were 
found in 90 percent of the cases (Wilson, 2007). Such a statistic suggests that 
significant noncompliance to trade commitments occurs. Furthermore, according to 
Wilson (2007) only 17 of 150 member nations (with the EU counted as one member) 
where ever subject to a ruling of the WTO panels or Appellate Body, and the US alone 
was the subject of 33 of the 109 rulings. As a result, given a possible long and   12
protracted set of negotiations that may take place even if a comprehensive agreement 
is reached on disease outbreaks and zones policies, these agreements may not be 
effective in mitigating the trade disruptions. 
 
  Of further concern is the self-enforcement component of the current WTO 
system. The only enforcement mechanism in the current system is retaliation.  Small 
economies may therefore be at a disadvantage since in reality retaliation may not be 
feasible. Participation in the dispute settlement process may not occur when the 
expected costs of the dispute resolution outweigh expected returns, or if uncertainty of 
success is high (Bown, 2005).  Therefore, violations in trade obligations such as those 
regarding disease outbreaks will likely occur if the nation experiencing the disease 
outbreak does not have the capacity to inflict welfare losses on their noncompliant 
trading partners.  
 
The PVYn case PEI is an example how a country can slow and even temporarily 
block trade despite evidence that it is itself not disease free. While the U.S. claimed that 
they were free of PVYn, empirical evidence from within the U.S. suggested that PVYn 
had existed in the U.S. prior to the outbreak in PEI. Eventually Canada was successful 
in demonstrating that PVYn existed in the US and so the US position of not accepting 
the scientific community’s evidence to claim disease free status and to continue the ban 
on PEI seed potatoes was temporary in nature.  However, the fact that the PEI seed 
potato industry never fully recovered from the ban highlights the fact that even 
temporary bans can permanently disrupt markets, especially markets where reputation 
is important, like the seed potato market.  
 
5.2  Compensation to producers 
 
The compensation history of the PVYn and potato wart outbreaks indicates 
compensation levels above the minimum recommended under the Seeds Act and 
Regulations.  The Seeds Act and Regulations provides only for compensation for 
product destroyed at market prices.  It does not provide for other losses, such as those 
resulting from lost markets, interrupted markets, loss in prestige or any other 
extraordinary costs.  
 
  Nevertheless AAFC provided compensation above that provided by the Seeds 
Act and Regulations in all cases, with little or no discussion about whether such 
compensation is in the public interest. AAFC purchased potatoes that were not infected 
by the PVYn virus in 1991 for $3.00/cwt from PEI and New Brunswick potato producers 
(JRG Consulting Group, 2003).  Additional compensation of approximately $15 million 
was given to PEI potato producers as an out-of-court settlement related to the PVYn 
disease outbreak. Compensation resulting from the potato wart outbreak to potato 
producers by the PEI government amounted to 10 cents per kg (CBC 2004b). Federal 
government support of $12.6 million was given to PEI potato producers to dispose of 
the surplus caused by the potato wart zones policy (Parliament of Canada, 2001).   
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  Government compensation to potato producers above that required by law 
resulting from disease outbreaks could have negative impacts on government 
responses in the future. Compensation above the minimum could imply an implicit 
obligation by government that could set a precedent for future disease outbreaks of a 
larger and more costly nature.  The fact that AAFC compensated PEI potato producers 
with $15 million after already purchasing surplus potatoes could have encouraged New 
Brunswick producers to initiate their lawsuit against the CFIA for additional 
compensation.  Furthermore, as a result of the 2006 Golden Nematode outbreak in 
Quebec, $5.4 million in compensation was awarded to 28 Quebec potato producers. It 
seems that AAFC has, at least implicitly, agreed that producers affected by such 
disease outbreaks are due compensation above that required by the Seeds Act and 
Regulations, since in all cases as they relate to potatoes in Canada such compensation 
has been forthcoming.  This could set a precedent for future disease outbreaks, 
especially for BSE which has potentially large industry effects and therefore costs.   
 
  Goodwin and Vado (2007), make the point that government policies related to 
risk insurance for agriculture in the US may be creating moral hazard problems.   
Compensation given to potato producers in Canada as a result of disease outbreaks in 
potatoes may also be contributing to the overall moral hazard problem of risk 
management policies developed by governments for agriculture.       
 
6.0  Summary and Conclusion  
 
The PVYn and the potato wart outbreak led to a ban on PEI seed potatoes 
entering the US. The seed potato market in PEI did not recover from these market 
shocks. However, the PVYn and potato wart outbreaks did not result in any long term 
losses to the PEI potato industry even though there seems to have been permanent 
losses to the PEI potato industry in the seed market, especially resulting from the PVYn 
disease outbreak.  In fact, the PEI potato industry as a whole has expanded 
tremendously over the last two decades, largely due to expansion of processing 
capacity by McCains Foods and Cavendish Farms. The PEI potato industry has been 
transformed from a seed and tablestock potato producing industry to a processing and 
tablestock producing industry.    
 
As a result of the increased valued-added processing, another PVYn disease 
outbreak in PEI would likely have only a minor disruption to PEI potato industry because 
the Province has largely abandoned this market.  However, this has come at the 
expense of reduced competition among the buyers of PEI potatoes since the expansion 
of the industry was fuelled by processing capacity expansion by two processors: 
Cavendish Farms and McCains foods.  There is evidence that other countries may have 
also pursued this strategy in response to other disease outbreaks.  
 
  The response of government to the PVYn and potato wart outbreaks was 
twofold: 1) develop a zones policy to reopen the US border to seed potatoes; and 2) 
compensate potato producers beyond the minimum required by the Seeds and 
Regulations Act.  Negotiations with the US have resulted in a zones policy solution,   14
where the details of the zones policy depend on the nature of the disease outbreak. 
Reductions in the length of subsequent bans of seed potatoes into the US with new 
potato disease outbreaks suggests that zones policies have become more effective 
over time.  The development of zones policies that are ex-ante, result from multilateral 
negotiations, and encompass a comprehensive list of diseases are needed.    
 
Compensating producers above levels required under the Seeds Act and 
Regulations could have set a costly precedent for compensation for other crops and 
disease outbreaks.  Furthermore, compensation may be contributing to a moral hazard 
problem for future disease outbreaks in Canadian potatoes.   
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